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Theo A. F. Kuipers 
ONE VERSUS MANY INTENDED APPLICATIONS 
REPLY TO SJOERD ZWART 
I am grateful to Sjoerd Zwart for the fact that he elaborated for the present 
purposes a point of view already present in Zwart (1998/2001), that may be 
representative for many logicians dealing with problems in the philosophy of 
science. His main claim is that I am mixing up what he calls “logical models” and 
“physical models.” From my point of view, however, the main divergence is that 
between the (dominant) model theoretic and the structuralist perspective, 
according to which the target of theorizing is one particular “intended 
application” and a set of “intended applications,” respectively. Although the 
suggested model theoretic perspective may be dominant, I would like to leave 
room for the possibility that an alternative model theory will be further developed 
and become respected, not to replace the present dominant one but as an 
alternative that is more suitable for certain purposes. However, contrary to 
Zwart’s suggestion, I do not see this alternative as a non-Tarskian move in some 
deep sense. Starting from Tarski’s basic definition, which is that of “truth in a 
structure” (Hodges 1986), there are at least two coherent ways of defining that a 
theory is true or false, depending on whether one has one or more than one 
intended application in mind. In this reply I will refrain from trying to give a 
response to  every detail of Zwart’s account. Instead, by focusing on some of his 
main points and by starting the elaboration of the ICR approach to domain 
revision, I wish to show that the suggested alternative model theory makes sense. 
Moreover, readers will be able to form their own opinion about whether Zwart’s 
exposition of the dominant approach applied to a couple of examples, in 
particular in Section 4, is illuminating or, which is my opinion, functions as a 
Procrustean bed, even for examples that do not seem to be very representative of 
scientific theories and domains, let alone for examples that are representative, 
such as theories about planetary systems.
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Two Perspectives on Four Problems and “Strong Falsehoods” 
Since Zwart in his Section 2 gives an adequate summary of some crucial elements 
of my approach in ICR, I start immediately by responding to the four problems set 
out in his Section 3.1 and his questioning of my definition of “strong falsehoods” 
in Section 3.2. 
Like Niiniluoto, Zwart objects to my earlier talking about “possible worlds” 
that are compatible in some sense, which is indeed problematic as long as one has 
one target “possible world” in mind. To avoid this connotation, I systematically 
talk in ICR about ‘conceptual possibilities’ instead. This is a general term, which 
may in specific contexts refer to possible kinds, states, systems, etc.
By calling it the “ICR-paradox of logical strength,” the second problem may 
seem more serious. Representing the “realized possibilities” at t and t', later than 
t, by R(t) and R(t'), and assuming that some (in a certain sense) new experiments 
have been performed between t and t', that is, some new possibilities have been 
realized, it follows that R(t) is a proper subset of R(t'). The paradoxical air arises 
from the fact that, although the evidence has increased in some sense, the 
linguistic representation of R(t') is weaker than that of R(t). The point is, of 
course, that these linguistic representations merely represent the theories of R(t)
and R(t'), respectively, in the logical sense of the set of sentences that are true on 
all their respective members. On the other hand, the evidence has increased in the 
sense that the relevant claim “R(t') is a subset of T” is stronger than “R(t) is a 
subset of T” (where T represents the target set of nomic possibilities). I fail to see 
this as a paradox, let alone an interesting one.
Zwart’s third problem amounts to the fact that “the linguistic representation of 
the experiments [R(t)] logically implies (!) the strongest accepted universal 
empirical law [S(t)]” (p. 383), due to the fact that R(t) is a subset of S(t). Again 
there is no problem if we look carefully. Indeed, the linguistic representation of 
R(t) logically entails the linguistic representation of S(t). However, the claim 
associated with R(t), viz. “R(t) is a subset of T”, does not at all entail the claim 
associated with S(t), i.e., that it represents a law, viz. “T is a subset of S(t)”.
Following Ruttkamp (2002, and her contribution to the companion volume), I like 
to call the first observation “the problem of overdetermination” of theories by 
data. As soon as we have performed some experiments, represented by R(t), the 
linguistic representation of the latter entails an enormous number of theories. 
Only some of them will be true, in the sense of true of all members of T, and, 
under certain conditions, just one will be the strongest. The task of further 
experimenting and theorizing is to zero in on true ones or the strongest true one. 
Although my distinction between the sets of conceptual possibilities R(t) and 
S(t) and the claims associated with them seems perfectly clear in ICR, a symbolic 
distinction may be useful for some specific purposes. With thanks to Roberto 
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Festa, I mention the following plausible symbolization of the claims. The claims 
associated with R(t) and S(t) may be denoted, in a transparent way, by r(t) and 
s(t). Hence, r(t) and s(t) amount to, respectively: 
r(t) { R(t)  T   s(t) { T  S(t)
If one likes one can also express the data available at t by: d(t) { r(t) & s(t).
From the above explicit definitions and from the following “temporal 
assumption” about the monotonic nature of data: 
R(t)  R(t') & S(t')  S(t)
it immediately follows that r(t') implies r(t) (but not vice versa) and that s(t')
implies s(t) (but not vice versa). Hence d(t') implies d(t) (but not vice versa). Of 
course, as Zwart will not dispute, it also immediately follows from the definitions 
that r(t) does not imply s(t).
Although essentially terminological, I find the fourth problem mentioned by 
Zwart, that is, my non-standard definition of a theory being false, the most 
interesting one. It stimulated me to explicitly talk about an “alternative model 
theory” in the introduction of this reply (and in the introduction of Part III of the 
ICR synopsis in this volume), for it enables me to indicate clearly where the 
dominant and the alternative model theory deviate. For further motivation of the 
following, see also the section “Some reflections on the definition of a ‘false 
theory’” in my reply to Burger and Heidema, which was written before the 
present reply.
I assume Tarski’s definition of a sentence, e.g. a (finitely) axiomatized theory, 
being either true or false in (or on) a structure of the relevant language. From the 
point of view of one target intended application, that is, one target structure, say t,
it is plausible to call a theory true or false depending on whether it is true or false 
on that structure. Since every sentence gets a truth-value on a structure and 
assuming that the linguistic representation of t, that is, the strongest true theory, is 
axiomatizable, it will be a complete theory. As long as the target structure is, for 
some reason or other, not yet clearly determined, but only known to belong to a 
certain set of structures, say Z, it is plausible to call a theory true when it is true 
on all Z-structures, false when it is false on all Z-structures, and indeterminate 
otherwise. By zeroing in from Z to t, all true/false-judgements remain the same, 
and the judgements ‘indeterminate’ can be replaced by either ‘true’ or ‘false’. 
However, when the target is a fixed set of structures, T, these definitions are 
no longer plausible. Then it becomes plausible to call a theory true (“as a 
hypothesis,” ICR, p. 184) when it is true on all T-structures, and false otherwise. 
The reason for the latter is that there apparently exists a counterexample to the 
claim that the theory is true on all T-structures. Note that this definition not only 
makes sense for theories in the empirical sciences, e.g. about planetary systems, 
but also for certain kinds of mathematical claims. For example, in group theory 
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one says that a purported theorem is true when it has been proved on the basis of 
the definition of a group and false when an appropriate (type) of counterexample 
has been provided. Of course, there is nothing mysterious about the fact that, 
according to this definition, a theory and its negation can both be false. However, 
a theory and its negation cannot both be true. 
This brings me immediately to the notion of “strong falsehoods.” The 
rationale of this terminology also presupposes the alternative perspective. As a 
matter of fact there are two plausible definitions. Although the first is even more 
plausible than the second, I restricted attention in ICR to the second because that 
permitted an adapted “consequence reading” of the relevant truthlikeness clause. 
But let me start with the first definition. A theory is strongly false in the first 
sense (sf1) if it is not merely false in the sense of being false on some T-structure,
but being false on all T-structures. A theory is strongly false in the second sense 
(sf2) if it is non-tautological and true on all non-T-structures or, equivalently, not 
merely false (in the sense of being false on some T-structure), but in addition true 
on all non-T-structures. From the dominant perspective both definitions make 
little (new) sense. For the first holds that, whether or not the target structure is 
already fully fixed, all and only false theories, that is, false in the dominant sense, 
would become sf1. In other words, sf1 coincides with false in the dominant sense. 
For the second holds that the definition is empty for a fixed target structure; and 
only indeterminate theories become sf2, viz. those theories that are only false on 
some Z-structures. Of course, as Zwart clearly illustrates, if you mix up two sets 
of definitions it is plausible that you may get queer results. For example, sf2-
theories are not false in the dominant sense, but indeterminate; however, as 
indicated, they are not merely indeterminate. 
Truth Approximation by Revision of the Domain of Intended Applications 
I would like to take the opportunity to elaborate a point that was put forward by 
Sjoerd Zwart earlier (1998/2001). Let me start by quoting from ICR (p. 207).
Finally, variable domains can also be taken into account, where the main changes concern 
extensions and restrictions. We will not study this issue, but see (Zwart 1998[/2001], Ch.2-4) 
for some illuminating elaborations in this connection, among other things, the way in which 
strengthening/weakening of a theory and extending/reducing its domain interact. 
More specifically, I propose a coherent set of definitions of ‘more truthlikeness’, 
‘empirical progress’ and ‘truth approximation’ due to a revision of the domain of 
intended applications. This set of definitions seems to be the natural counterpart 
of the basic definitions of similar notions in ICR as far as theory revision is 
concerned. Regarding theory revision, there will be some overlap with Zwart’s 
contribution.
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Assuming the distinction between a vocabulary V and a subvocabulary Vd as 
“domain vocabulary,” a distinction that was only made explicit in the last chapter 
of ICR, we may also assume that the domain of intended applications can be 
represented as a well-defined subset D of the set of conceptual possibilities 
(potential models) Mp(Vd) generated by Vd. Leaving out the distinction between 
theoretical and observational terms, the target set of structures T(D) is the set of 
nomic possibilities corresponding to D within the set of conceptual possibilities 
Mp(V) generated by V.
For subsets X and Y of Mp(V) representing theories the basic definition for “Y
is at least as close to T as X” in ICR (cf. (2) in Zwart’s contribution; see also 
Miller’s evaluation of the basic definition, his own definition and some other 
explications of verisimilitude) amounts to 
(a) YT  XT    
(b) TY  TX
With a plausible strengthening to capture ‘closer to’, viz. by requiring a proper
subset relation at least once, this results in ‘more truthlikeness due to theory 
revision’, keeping (the vocabularies and) the domain fixed. Note that this 
definition already makes formal sense without the specific interpretation of X, Y
and T.
However, we may also consider what happens when we change the domain 
and fix the theory. The following definition is then plausible. For domains D1 and 
D2, and T(D1)=T1 and T(D2)=T2, “X is at least as close to T2 as to T1” iff “T2 is 
at least as close to X as T1”
(ac) T2X  T1X    
(bc) XT2  XT1
again with a plausible strengthening to capture ‘closer to’, now resulting in ‘more 
truthlikeness due to domain revision’.
When drawing plausible pictures, with X fixed, T1 replacing T and T2
replacing Y, it is interesting to see that the revisions go in the opposite direction: 
whereas Y approaches T, starting from X, T2 approaches X, starting from T1. The 
divergent graphic representation of the proper subset requirements reflects this in 
particular. The same switch of direction is relevant for design research. Whereas a 
new drug may be better for a certain disease than an old one, a certain drug may 
be better for another disease than the original target disease, a phenomenon which 
was nicely captured by the title of a study by Rein Vos (1991): “Drugs looking for 
diseases.”
Let us turn to the notion of empirical progress. In ICR the basic definition of 
‘empirical progress by theory revision’ is based on the subsets R and S of Mp(V),
representing the set of realized possibilities of D (at a certain moment) and the 
strongest law about D (inductively) based on R, respectively. The minimal 
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condition for empirical progress, viz. “Y is at least as successful wrt R/S as X”,
amounts (in)formally to the following two conditions”: 
(a-R) R  X  R Y: all established examples of X are examples of Y
(b-S) S  X  S Y: all established successes of X are successes of Y
Whereas the paraphrase of the first formal clause will be clear enough, that of the 
second may need some explication. A superset of SX represents a law, for it is 
entailed by S, which is also entailed by X, hence a success of X. The formal clause 
guarantees that such a success is also a success of Y.
Crucial in ICR is the Success Theorem, according to which “being closer to 
the truth” entails “being at least as successful,” assuming the correct data 
hypotheses (CD): R T S. This theorem provides several reasons (ICR, p. 62) 
for claiming that empirical progress by theory revision is functional for truth 
approximation (by theory revision). 
Turning to domain revision, let R1 and R2 represent the relevant sets of 
realized possibilities of the corresponding domains D1 and D2, and S1 and S2 the 
corresponding strongest laws. Now it is plausible to define “X is at least as 
successful wrt R2/S2 than wrt R1/S1” or “X is at least as successful wrt D2 than 
wrt D1 (as far as the available data are concerned)” iff 
(ac-R) R1XR2X: all established R1-examples of X are R2-examples
(bc-S) S1XS2X: all established S1-successes of X are S2-successes
As a counterpart to the Success Theorem, regarding theory revision, we would 
now like to prove the following
Success Theorem, regarding domain revision: 
“X is closer to T2 than to T1” entails
“X is at least as successful wrt R2/S2 than wrt R1/S1”
To prove this theorem we again need, of course, the relevant CD-hypotheses, viz. 
R1T1S1 and R2T2S2. But we need some more, again plausible, relational 
assumptions. If a realized possibility of D1 also is one of D2, it is recognized as 
such. Formally: R1T2R2, and of course vice versa: R2T1R1. Similarly, a 
law entailed by S1 that also holds for D2, is recognized as such, that is, it is also 
entailed by S2. Formally: S1T2S2, and vice versa S2T1S1.
It is easy to check that the latter assumptions are implied when we start from 
sets R and S relating to a domain D covering D1 and D2, and define R1=RT1,
R2=RT2 and S1=ST1, S2=ST2. These definitions amount to the assumptions 
that, for example, R1 captures all realized possibilities of D1, and S1 the strongest 
established law about D1.
The consequence of the theorem is that ‘empirical progress by domain 
revision’ is functional for ‘truth approximation by domain revision’ in a similar 
way as the corresponding type of theory revision. 
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Turning to the quote from ICR at the beginning of this subsection, the result of 
all this is that a theory may indeed come closer to the (relevant) truth by either 
theory revision in the form of strengthening or weakening a theory and by domain 
revision in the form of extending or reducing the domain. Moreover, a theory may 
come closer to the (relevant) truth by a combination of such revisions. Similar 
conclusions apply for the possibility for a theory to become more successful. Due 
to the two success theorems the latter will be functional for truth approximation, 
but there is, of course, no guarantee. 
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